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This thesis identifies the potential future mission profile of an unmanned aircraft 
systems (UAS) program within a domestic law enforcement agency after implementation 
of UAS regulations, a task currently in progress by the Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA).   
First, the author reviews current academic literature and provides analysis on key 
policy issues of safety, the transfer of risk, and constitutional rights. Then, the author 
consults the knowledge and experience of individuals responsible for the integration 
architecture of UAS through an IRB-approved online survey. The survey of these subject 
matter experts using the Delphi method resulted in the following recommendations: 
 early public engagement and transparency for intended UAS use by law 
enforcement 
 a policy framework that addresses safe operation and privacy 
 further investment in “sense and avoid” technology 
 the development of a comprehensive UAS training program 
This academically rigorous consultation provides law enforcement executives and 
elected officials the policy implications of initiating a new UAS program and the 
groundwork to assess existing UAS programs. 
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Written in 1948, George Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four prophesied a totalitarian 
nightmare, one specter of which was a police patrol helicopter that skimmed down 
between the roofs like a small blue bottle and snooped into windows. That capability is 
now reality. U.S. law enforcement agencies, leveraging a decade of military combat 
success, are considering the implementation of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) 
programs. Communities big and small have grown accustomed to both helicopters and 
planes of different sizes, weights, and speeds crossing the sky above them. However, it 
has been and continues to be a challenge to integrate UAS into airspace designed for 
manned aircraft and rules written from a legacy framework. In 2008 and 2012, the 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) insisted that the United States “develop a clear 
and common understanding of what is required to safely and routinely operate UAS in” 
the National Airspace System (NAS).1 Congress also recognized the importance of UAS 
integration with the enactment of the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012.2  
The policy discourse related to UAS integration is technically, legally, and 
politically complex. Placing UAS in the hands of law enforcement has become a 
flashpoint, triggering intense debates for an American public concerned with losing 
privacy and pieces of humanity to UAS in the sky, a framework described in Orwell’s 
fictional prophecy. There is an opportunity to not only expand UAS capabilities, but also 
assuage fears if law enforcement leaders properly construct and execute UAS policy. 
Domestic UAS use, specifically by law enforcement, represents uncharted policy 
territory. While there is a solid body of knowledge on aviation principles, airspace 
management and the legal constructs that will most certainly be involved in the policy 
development, additional research on the use of UAS after proposed integration into the 
NAS for domestic law enforcement operations is warranted. This will allow law 
                                                 
1 Government Accountability Office (GAO), Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Federal Actions (GAO-08-
511) (Washington, DC: GAO, 2008); Government Accountability Office (GAO) Unmanned Aircraft 
Systems Measuring Progress and Addressing Potential Privacy Concerns Would Facilitate Integration into 
the National Airspace System (GAO-12-981) (Washington, DC: GAO, 2012). 
2 Federal Aviation Administration Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, 2012. 
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enforcement executives and elected officials to make informed decisions when 
determining whether a UAS program is appropriate for the community they pledge to 
protect. Within the homeland security enterprise, a UAS program has unlimited potential. 
However, concerns for safe operation, integration into NAS, the transfer of risk and 
liability to autonomous unmanned systems, and debates on constitutional rights raise 
questions as to whether UAS are appropriate for law enforcement,  and if so, under what 
policy frameworks. 
This researcher sought to identify knowledge gaps and find answers to important 
UAS policy questions that law enforcement executives are considering while attempting 
to leverage technology to achieve greater efficiency and effectiveness in the face of 
dwindling resources and growing demands for service. The questions addressed: 
 How might the integration of UAS under the FAA’s Integration of Civil 
Unmanned Aircraft System NAS Roadmap3 affect their use by law 
enforcement?  
 How will new regulations address the issues of safety, liability, and 
privacy. UAS technologists have focused on expanding their capabilities 
by developing more diverse functions, and the possibility of useful 
application within law enforcement seems endless. 
 What might the mission profile of a law enforcement UAS program look 
like after the proposed regulatory environment is in place?  
This research was conducted on the assumption that law enforcement executives 
and elected officials will need to contend with a plethora of complex policy issues when 
deciding whether a UAS program is appropriate for their jurisdiction, whether such a 
program supplements existing aviation capabilities, or whether it establishes new ones. 
The conceptual framework and core principles for law enforcement UAS policy will be 
established by merging the knowledge base and experience of implementing new 
technologies with existing case law and early engagement with a concerned public. These 
additional findings and recommendations will change as the policy landscape develops.  
                                                 
3 Department of Transportation and Federal Aviation Administration, Integration of Civil Unmanned 
Aircraft Systems (UAS) in the National Airspace System (NAS) Roadmap (Washington, DC: FAA, 2013). 
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Following a comprehensive literature review of the key policy issues, the Delphi 
Method was deployed to aggregate and code the knowledge and judgment of subject 
matter experts involved with UAS integration and law enforcement UAS policy 
development. The subject matter experts recruited for the Delphi panel were identified by 
senior personnel at the Unmanned Aircraft Systems Integration Office, Federal Aviation 
Administration, and Department of Transportation. The literature review confirmed that 
these individuals were centrally involved in the development of UAS regulations and 
possessed experience with law enforcement UAS policy. Nine respondents were recruited 
for participation, and all nine participated in all three rounds of data collection.  
To combine independent analysis with maximum feedback for building consensus 
and recognizing dissent among UAS integration experts, an institutional review board 
(IRB)-approved sequence was established for Delphi panel participants. The collection of 
data from the Delphi panel established the framework for predictions and 
recommendations. 
The analysis of the literature review and Delphi panel concluded that a UAS 
program could be established and/or sustained effectively with the appropriate policy 
framework. 
A police department should plan for early community engagement, prior to UAS 
program implementation with these guidelines in mind: 
 Engage the public early with transparency on intended use will assist in 
building public trust;  
 Educate the public with a focus on the dramatic differences between a 
large military predator drone reserved for combat operations and the small 
quad copters (similar to an radio-controlled flyer) under evaluation as a 
tool for law enforcement;  
 Build a UAS mission profile based on input from  the local community 
that allows the mission to drive the use of the technology and does not 
encroach on the fringe or outside the boundaries of public acceptance; 
 Select an advisory board that will develop your concept of operations;  and   
 Mandate that operators follow established FAA regulations and receive 
approval through the COA process. Police executives and elected officials 
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must know that the COA process does not equate to safe operations, and is 
only the minimal requirement threshold to operate a UAS in the NAS. 
Implementation of safety management system similar to those in manned 
aviation is recommended. 
An agency must adopt a comprehensive policy framework that addresses safe 
operations and privacy—including data retention and storage—and that protects 
personally identifiable information and identifies a specific mission profile. The 
International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) publication Guidelines for the Use 
of Unmanned Aircraft4 offers a model that can act as a template for such policy 
development. 
The lack of regulatory airworthiness standards remains a barrier to safe 
operations. Police departments should therefore model practices from manned aviation 
and develop standards for UAS procurement, maintenance, and inspection intervals. 
Opening dialogue with approved UAS test sites may be helpful to policy development in 
this area.   
The combined action of regulatory agencies, UAS industry professionals, 
academics, public safety professional and private sector interests is required to fully 
develop, implement and mandate “sense and avoid technology” to increase safe 
operations. Police employees, including commanders who are assigned UAS must 
complete a robust agency-approved training program to ensure proper use and operations. 
The UAS policy landscape is highly fluid at the time. This thesis focused on 
whether a law enforcement agency should operate a UAS. The findings show that with 
the acquisition and maintenance of technical, legal, and policy expertise, law enforcement 
agencies can and should take advantage of the cost savings, technical capabilities, and 
mission performance offered by this technology. 
  
                                                 
4 International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), Recommended Guidelines for the Use of 
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Written in 1948, George Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four prophesied a totalitarian 
nightmare, one specter of which was a police patrol helicopter that skimmed down 
between the roofs like a small blue bottle and snooped into windows. That capability is 
now reality. U.S. law enforcement agencies, leveraging a decade of military combat 
success, are considering the implementation of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) 
programs. Communities big and small have grown accustomed to both helicopters and 
planes of different sizes, weights, and speeds crossing the sky above them. However, it 
has been and continues to be a challenge to integrate UAS into airspace designed for 
manned aircraft and rules written from a legacy framework. In 2008 and 2012, the 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) insisted that the United States “develop a clear 
and common understanding of what is required to safely and routinely operate UAS in” 
the National Airspace System (NAS).1 Congress also recognized the importance of UAS 
integration with the enactment of the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012.2  
The policy discourse related to UAS integration is technically, legally, and 
politically complex. Placing UAS in the hands of law enforcement has become a 
flashpoint, triggering intense debates for an American public concerned with losing 
privacy and pieces of humanity to UAS in the sky, a framework described in Orwell’s 
fictional prophecy. There is an opportunity to not only expand UAS capabilities, but also 
assuage fears if law enforcement leaders properly construct and execute UAS policy. 
Domestic UAS use, specifically by law enforcement, represents uncharted policy 
territory. While there is a solid body of knowledge on aviation principles, airspace 
management and the legal constructs that will most certainly be involved in the policy 
development, additional research on the use of UAS after proposed integration into the 
NAS for domestic law enforcement operations is warranted. This will allow law 
                                                 
1 Government Accountability Office (GAO), Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Federal Actions (GAO-08-
511) (Washington, DC: GAO, 2008); Government Accountability Office (GAO) Unmanned Aircraft 
Systems Measuring Progress and Addressing Potential Privacy Concerns Would Facilitate Integration into 
the National Airspace System- (GAO-12-981) (Washington, DC: GAO, 2012). 
2 Federal Aviation Administration Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, 2012. 
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enforcement executives and elected officials to make informed decisions when 
determining whether a UAS program is appropriate for the community they pledge to 
protect. Within the homeland security enterprise, a UAS program has unlimited potential. 
However, concerns for safe operation, integration into NAS, the transfer of risk and 
liability to autonomous unmanned systems, and debates on constitutional rights raise 
questions as to whether UAS are appropriate for law enforcement,  and if so, under what 
policy frameworks. 
UAS make for an appealing public safety tool. They are small, lightweight, agile, 
and remotely controlled with surveillance capabilities, and they are considered cost 
effective.3 A law enforcement executive must weigh the capabilities of this technology 
with the needs of the community: A well-trained law enforcement agency applies Fourth 
Amendment protections when it considers the use of technology and understands when 
search warrants are necessary. Emerging technologies and the application of the Fourth 
Amendment have been the subjects of much debate. The privacy issues are the most 
difficult to navigate because they elicit human emotions, attitudes and interpretations 
reminiscent of Orwell.  
Law enforcement officials will have to engage the community early and with 
effective messaging if they expect the public to support UAS use for public safety 
missions. Transparency about the risks, the advantages, the costs, and limits; about the 
thoughtful, thorough, and rigorous process by which the policies and programs have been 
developed; and even about the public’s role in the success and oversight of a new 
capability are critical to gaining the public trust and UAS programs sustainability.4 
                                                 
3 Craig Schlag, “The New Privacy Battle: How the Expanding use of Drones Continues to Erode our 
Concept of Privacy and Privacy Rights,” Journal of Technology, Law and Policy 13 (2013). 
4 Donald Shinnamon, “Personal Privacy and the use of Small Unmanned Aircraft by Law 
Enforcement,” Air Beat, August 2011. 
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A. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
How might the integration of UAS under the FAA’s Integration of Civil 
Unmanned Aircraft System NAS Roadmap5 affect their use by law enforcement? A 
qualitative analysis of the integration plans that will regulate law enforcement UAS 
operations is necessary. How will new regulations address the issues of safety, liability 
and privacy so that law enforcement executives and elected officials can make informed 
decisions as to the implementation of a UAS program in their community? 
While government regulations are still in development, many public safety 
agencies already have approved the limited use of UAS. These specific missions are 
defined by the FAA’s precedence of approving only certificates of authorizations for 
incidents involving a “defined perimeter.” However, in recent years, UAS specialists 
have focused on developing more diverse functions, and the possibilities of useful 
application within law enforcement seem endless. What might the mission profile of a 
law enforcement UAS program look like after the proposed regulatory environment is in 
place?  
B. IMPORTANCE 
Today’s law enforcement executives and elected officials, faced with dwindling 
resources and growing demands for service, are striving to leverage technology to 
achieve greater efficiency and effectiveness. Emerging technologies such as UAS could 
play a vital role in the daily work of both frontline police officers and homeland security 
officials of other disciplines, equipping them with a cost-effective aerial platform that has 
the potential of making them better informed, more efficient, safer, and more effective. 
Police executives and elected officials considering implementing a UAS program must 
manage an increasingly complex array of policy issues and be proactive with messaging 
that will counter a narrative of public intrusiveness. It also will be necessary to mitigate 
risk by ensuring compliance with safe operational standards and advocate for additional 
technology that will increase safety and reduce vicarious liability. In a proposed 
                                                 
5 Department of Transportation and Federal Aviation Administration, Integration of Civil Unmanned 
Aircraft Systems (UAS) in the National Airspace System (NAS) Roadmap (Washington, DC: FAA, 2013). 
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regulatory environment, certain knowledge gaps require research so that police 
executives and elected officials can consider UAS technology implementation in support 
of their agencies’ strategic goals.  
C. OBJECTIVES AND LIMITS 
The objective of this thesis is to predict a viable mission profile for UAS within a 
domestic law enforcement agency that incorporates proposed and pending FAA 
regulations on UAS integration into NAS. It is designed for use by law enforcement 
leadership and local elected officials as they consider the policy implications of initiating 
and sustaining a LE/UAS program.  
This research was conducted with the assumption that law enforcement executives 
and elected officials will need to contend with complex policy issues when deciding 
whether a UAS program is appropriate for their jurisdiction, and whether such a program 
supplements existing aviation capabilities or establishes new ones.  
The conceptual framework and core principles for law enforcement UAS policy 
will be established by merging the knowledge base and experience of implementing new 
technologies with existing case law and early engagement with a concerned public. These 
additional findings and recommendations will change as the policy landscape develops.  
D. UPCOMING CHAPTERS  
Three themes dominate current academic literature related to UAS. First, safe 
operation has plagued the UAS industry dating back to its military applications; it is still 
the primary concern of UAS integration by the FAA. Second, a new privacy battle has 
emerged during a period of expanding UAS use. Third, a theme has emerged as a parallel 
policy debate with the development of the autonomous car: the transfer of risk and 
liability.  
Concentrating on these three issues, the following chapters provide an 
introduction to the key considerations for law enforcement executives by conducting an 
extensive literature review and surveying subject matter experts responsible for 
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developing the proposed UAS architecture. The remainder of this thesis is organized as 
follows: 
 Chapter II establishes the role of aviation in past and present policing and 
summarizes the academic literature of the UAS regulatory landscape. 
Recognizing that practices of other nations provides positive and negative 
lessons. A comparative approach of international UAS integration focuses 
on the analytical UAS policy framework employed by other democratic 
countries with different legal, political, and social context. The research 
attempts to predict the future mission profile of a law enforcement UAS 
program after reviewing the major policy issues of privacy, safety, and 
liability.    
 Chapter III addresses the Delphi method and its application. It examines 
the most current and topical opinions of subject matter experts responsible 
for developing the proposed UAS architecture and opening the dialogue 
that has shaped the early stages of UAS policy development for law 
enforcement. The Delphi method is applied in this research project to 
investigate the key policy issues prevalent in the literature. 
 Chapter IV summarizes the responses of subject matters experts that 
voluntarily participated in Delphi surveys under an approved IRB by the 
Naval Postgraduate School. The objective of the survey questions was to 
fill the existing knowledge gaps of safe operations, liability, and safe 
operation.  
 Chapter V concludes with policy recommendations and an analysis of the 
themes that dominate the survey responses. These recommendations will 
be available to law enforcement executives.  
 6
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II. BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. HISTORICAL CONTEXT ON POLICE AVIATION 
The use of aircraft in support of law enforcement operations has been an integral 
part of many agencies’ public safety missions for years. Because airborne assets, 
including helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft, require extensive training, maintenance, 
and regulatory commitments, only large agencies with sufficient resources can support 
airborne operations. 
The history of police aviation does not figure prominently into any scholarship. 
The limited amount of existing academic research provides only basic history. Aircraft 
was first used in police work in 1914 in Miami, FL, for the pursuit of a jewel thief.6 The 
NYPD is recognized as creating the first official airborne law enforcement unit in the 
mid-1920s by using fixed-wing aircraft to track barnstormers that would recklessly fly 
over the city, launching from fields just outside the city limits. In the 21st century, police 
aviation units are thought to be a beneficial support function to a law enforcement 
agency, although little to no academic research has been completed to support such a 
claim.  
However, evidence that police departments believe the benefits outweigh the 
costs of financially supporting aviation programs exists in a special report published by 
the Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics in 2007, Aviation Units in Large 
Law Enforcement Agencies.7 A police aircrew brings a broader sense of vision than an 
officer on the ground, allowing a well-trained police aircrew to give advanced alerts of 
upcoming dangers and opportunities that may not be visible from the ground.8 The 
aircrew can remain undetected for long periods of time, allowing them to monitor a 
                                                 
6 Bryn Elliott, “Police Aviation, a History,” Police Aviation News, 2004, 
http://www.policeaviationnews.com/policeaviation%201914-1990.pdf. 
7 Lynn Langton, Bureau of Justice Statistics Special Report: Aviation Units in Large Law Enforcement 
Agencies (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, July 2007), 
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/aullea07.pdf. 
8 Kevin P. Means, Tactical Helicopter Missions How to Fly Safe, Effective Airborne Law Enforcement 
Missions. (Springfield, IL: Charles C Thomas, 2007).  
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public safety situation and communicate their observations to incident commanders. 
Additionally, aircrews can cover more distance in less time, allowing for a more timely 
response to certain calls for service. 
B. ADMINISTRATIVE AND REGULATORY RESTRICTIONS 
In August 2012, a subcommittee of the nation’s largest police executive 
organization, the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), working in 
collaboration with the Airborne Law Enforcement Association (ALEA), released a 
position paper that provides guidelines for the use of unmanned aircraft by law 
enforcement agencies.9 The Recommended Guidelines on the Use of Unmanned Aircraft 
suggested early community engagement to include discussions related to search and 
seizure concerns and basic system requirements.10 IACP guidelines for operational 
procedures focused on safety and image retention were included in the recommendations. 
The following year, the Office of the Inspector General Audit Division within the U.S. 
Department of Justice (DOJ) released an interim report on the use and support of UAS.11 
The report listed eight recommendations for future policy development, reporting 
requirements and UAS grant funding oversight. Both reports signal recognition within the 
law enforcement community that small UAS are an attractive, lower-cost enhancement to 
existing police aviation programs. 
The current national policy on unmanned public aircraft operational approval by 
the FAA went into effect in 2013.12 The policy has been published as temporary, internal 
guidance to provide both an approval process and regulatory environment while more 
                                                 
9 International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), Recommended Guidelines for the Use of 
Unmanned Aircraft. (IACP: Alexandria, VA, August 2012), 
http://www.theiacp.org/portals/0/pdfs/iacp_uaguidelines.pdf. 
10 International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), Recommended Guidelines for the Use of 
Unmanned Aircraft (IACP: Alexandria, VA, August 2011), 
http://www.theiacp.org/portals/0/pdfs/iacp_uaguidelines.pdf 
11 Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Audit Division, Interim Report on the 
Department of Justice’s Use and Support of Unmanned Aircraft Systems. (Washington, DC: Department of 
Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Audit Division, September 2013), 
http://www.justice.gov/oig/reports/2013/a1337.pdf. 
12 Department of Transportation. Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Operational Approval (N 
8900.227) (Washington, DC: FAA, July 30, 2013), http://fsims.faa.gov/wdocs/notices/n8900_227.htm. 
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permanent, integrated regulations were being developed. It incorporates many of the 
same concepts used in manned aviation, such as pilot and observer qualifications and risk 
management strategies. The UAS industry has seen a successful challenge to the 
temporary guidance. In March 2014, a National Transportation Safety Board 
administrative judge ruled that the Federal Aviation Administration lacked the authority 
to enforce rules on UAS because it had not followed the legislatively mandated 
government rule-making process, leaving them non-binding to the public at large. New 
federal rules need to follow a specific procedure under federal law if they are to be valid. 
The decision struck down the FAA’s ban regarding model aircraft and small UAS for 
commercial use.  
In the fall of 2013, the FAA released the Integration of Civil Unmanned Aircraft 
System in the National Airspace System (NAS) Roadmap and the UAS Comprehensive 
Plan. A Report on the Nation’s UAS Path Forward.13 These documents govern civil UAS 
flights in the United States and include an FAA plan to work directly with the 
Department of Justice-National Institute of Justice to expand the number of law 
enforcement agencies legally permitted to operate a UAS. The critical question that the 
framework attempts to answer is this: How do we integrate UAS into an already 
overloaded air traffic control system?14  
In developing a roadmap for integration, the FAA worked with manufacturers, 
vendors, trade associations, technical standards organizations, academic institutions, 
research and development centers and governmental agencies. These representatives were 
tasked with developing a plan that would not negatively impact current airspace capacity, 
decrease safety or increase risks of persons or property in the air or on the ground.15 
                                                 
13 Department of Transportation (DOT) and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Integration 
of Civil Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) in the National Airspace System (NAS) (Washington, DC: DOT 
and FAA), http://www.faa.gov/uas/media/uas_roadmap_2013.pdf; The Joint Planning and Development 
Office (JPDO), Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Comprehensive Plan, A Report on the Nation’s UAS 
Path Forward (Washington, DC: JPDO, September 2013), 
http://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/agi/reports/media/uas_comprehensive_plan.pdf. 
14 Stephen Pope, “FAA Releases Drone Integration Roadmap,” Flying Magazine, November 7, 2013. 
http://www.flyingmag.com/news/faa-releases-drone-integration-roadmap. 
15 Department of Transportation and Federal Aviation Administration, Integration of Civil Unmanned 
Aircraft Systems (UAS) in the National Airspace System (NAS) Roadmap (Washington, DC: FAA, 2013). 
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Included in the roadmap was an implementation timeline that has been the focal point of 
UAS industry expansion.   
Only a small amount of scholarly literature provides recommendations on how to 
best approach integration. These documents govern civil UAS flights in the United States 
and include an FAA plan to work directly with the Department of Justice-National 
Institute of Justice to expand the number of law enforcement agencies legally permitted 
to operate a UAS. The Association of Unmanned Vehicle Systems International 
(AUVSI), a lobby to advance the unmanned systems and robotics community, published 
a report in 2010 aimed toward its legislative objective of increasing airspace “access to 
ensure that obstacles to advancing and fielding UAS and robotics are removed.”16 The 
report argues that “the U.S. economy would benefit enormously if UAS had access to the 
NAS. AUVSI also warned that a failure to integrate UAS would impede military 
readiness by limiting the Department of Defense’s ability to stay at the forefront of new 
technology, and negatively impact jobs and the aviation industry.”17 The argument 
spurred action that resulted in bi-partisan support for integration. The report recommends 
that public/private partnerships be developed to support civil UAS test sites focused on 
furthering the development of three technological objectives, which are  
sense and avoid systems, control and communications links, and general 
UAS safety. Manned aircraft implements a concept known as “see and 
avoid.” However, a remotely piloted aircraft requires an alternative safety 
system because it cannot always “see” obstacles.18 
Innovations in UAS technology have the potential of impacting manned aviation 
in a positive way by improving cockpit and air traffic automation and fostering an 
                                                 
.16 Stephen Maddox and David Stuckenberg, “Drones in the U.S. National Airspace System: A Safety 
and Security Assessment,” Harvard Law School National Security Journal, February 24, 2015. 
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18 Stephen Maddox and David Stuckenberg, “Drones in the U.S. National Airspace System: A Safety 




environment of air traffic separation necessary to avoid collisions. These improvements 
will be brought on by the advancement of novel communications architectures, collision 
and terrain avoidance systems, autonomous controls, information-sharing networks and 
alternative fuels.19 The digital age has created a time in history when more tasks can be 
completed virtually and by remote control, saving a considerable amount of personnel 
and resources.20  
The Center of International Policy has led a dissenting debate within the public 
policy community. This public policy think tank places a spotlight on an alleged or feared 
lack of transparency and governance over the proliferation of drone use over the 
homeland.21 It has raised ethical issues, for example, alleging that large sums of money 
funneled by the industry to lawmakers have poisoned the process to select UAS test sites. 
Proliferation of UAS has advanced far ahead of the processes of democratic governance, 
creating an anxiety about a technology that has the potential to shift the power balance 
between the framework entrusted to protect the public and civil liberties.22 U.S. Congress 
and the Executive Branch have an obligation to ensure that civil liberties and privacy are 
not violated. There remains concern that the U.S. military and intelligence apparatus 
related to UAS will too broadly spill over to domestic affairs without proper oversight. 
This obligation can be met by formulating policy that establishes regulations that provide 
the necessary protections. 
                                                 
19 Matthew T. DeGarmo, Issues Concerning Integration of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in Civil 
Airspace (McLean, VA: MITRE Center for Advanced Aviation System Development, November 2004). 
20 Timothy Ravich, The Integration of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles into the n=National Airspace, 
accessed September 15, 2015. http://ravichaviation.files.wordpress.com/2014/06/the-integration-of-
unmanned-aerial-vehicles-into-the-national-airspace1.pdf. 
21 Tom Barry, Drones Over the Homeland: How Politics, Money and Lack of Oversight Have Sparked 
Drone Proliferation, and What We Can Do (Washington, DC: Center for International Policy, April 2013). 
http://www.ciponline.org/images/uploads/publications/IPR_Drones_over_Homeland_Final.pdf. 
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C. MEDIA SOURCES 
Media headlines are indicative of the burgeoning trend toward integration and 
acceptance of domestic UAS operations. An article that appeared in USA Today 
highlights the investment that the FAA is making in preparation for integration and the 
partnerships with academia and the private sector it feels are necessary to be successful.23 
There is growing recognition that police executives and elected officials are actively 
examining the potential application and impact on the use of UAS in their community as 
evidenced by news articles from cities such as Los Angeles.24 The UAS industry’s largest 
trade group predicts “hundreds of thousands of jobs and tens of billions in economic 
impacts from domestic commercial UAS use.”25 Customers in the petroleum and 
agriculture industry are among some of the first to receive approval from the FAA.26 
Media coverage of UAS used by the military abroad during counterterrorism operations 
and in civil missions within the homeland has increased substantially since 2009.27  
D. UNITED KINGDOM AND CANADIAN PERSPECTIVE 
The United Kingdom (UK) is well ahead of the United States with integration into 
European airspace by the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) under CAP722 regulations 
first established in May 2002.28 The original UK UAS regulations mirrored those of 
manned aircraft, requiring airworthiness certification and an approval process for 
companies designing, developing and manufacturing unmanned aircraft. As a result of 
shifts in regulatory responsibilities since the formation of the European Aviation Safety 
                                                 
23 Bart Jansen, “FAA Names 6 Sites for Testing Drones, USA Today, December 30, 2013. 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/12/30/drone-test-sites/4248771/. 
24 Ruben Vives, “LAPD’s Beck Says He’ll Seek Input before Considering Using Drones,” Los 
Angeles Times, http://www.latimes.com/local/la-me-lapd-drone-20140606-story.html. 
25  Darryl Jenkins and Bijan Vasigh, The Economic Impact of Unmanned Aircraft Systems Integration 
in the United States (Arlington, VA: Association for Unmanned Vehicle Systems International, March 
2013). 
26 T. S. Blanchard, “Commercial Drone Industry Aiming for Lift-Off,” Record, June 27, 2014. 
27 Tara McKelvey, Media Coverage of the Drone Program (Cambridge, MA: Joan Shorenstein Center 
on the Press, Politics and Public Policy), http://journalistsresource.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/D-77-
McKelvey.pdf. 
28 D. R. Haddon and C. J. Whittaker, UK-CAA Policy for Light UAV Systems (London: UK Civil 
Aviation Authority, 2004). http://www.caa.co.uk/default.aspx?catid=1416&pageid=8547. 
 13
Agency (EASA), the regulations were targeted for review. Other factors included in 
revisions to these regulations included the development of new technologies such as 
“sense and avoid.” In an effort to modernize its regulations, UK aviation authorities have 
released five revisions to UAS regulations since 2002. Each time, it attempts to predict 
how the civil UAS market is likely to grow in terms of aircraft mass and altitude 
capability.29 The benefit of this literature is that it sheds light on an environment in which 
the use of this technology is ahead of the United States, but it also recognizes the 
different political and legal framework. The flagship public safety event in the UK in 
which a UAS was deployed by the police occurred in 2007, during a large music festival 
that had traditionally been plagued with mass violence.30 The use of UAS for mass 
surveillance in the UK has gained more public acceptance then is anticipated in the 
United States.  
Canadian police also have deployed drones to support their field forces under 
strict conditions that are monitored by Transport Canada, the regulatory body responsible 
for enforcing UAS regulation in that country.31 In October 2012, in response to an 
increase in requests to deploy a UAS by local police departments across Canada, 
Transport Canada published a Guidebook for the Integrating Micro Unmanned Aerial 
System in Police and Emergency Operations.32 
                                                 
29 UK Civil Aviation Authority, Unmanned Aircraft System Operations in UK Guidance. CAP 722, 
March 31, 2015. http://www.caa.co.uk/docs/33/cap722.pdf. 
30 “ ‘Spy Helicopter’ Used at Festival, BBC News, August 19, 2007. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/england/6953650.stm. 
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Aerial System  (DRDC CSSCR 2012–012) (Ottawa, ON, Canada: Defense R&D Canada). http://lgdata.s3-
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Today, with many police forces in major cities in Canada now using UAS, similar 
concerns have been growing over privacy and surveillance.33 The Office of the Privacy 
Commissioner of Canada (OPC) has raised various concerns regarding UAS use in law 
enforcement.34 Highlighted in a March 2013 report, the privacy watchdog has expressed 
that the characteristics and capabilities of a UAS can result in a covert from of 
surveillance a similar argument from privacy groups in the United States.35 An argument 
is made by the OPC that existing Canadian regulations fail to strike the balance between 
intended use and the related privacy implications. Current Canadian regulations 
governing UAS operations have more to do with ensuring their safe flight. The Canadian 
OPC has recommended use of UAS video surveillance in a way that minimizes invasion 
of privacy, public transparency, and continued impact assessment; recommendations 
similar to that of the IACP. 
E. CURRENT PROFILE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT UAS PROGRAMS 
The introduction of UAS in domestic law enforcement operations and policy has 
occurred or is being considered at local, state and federal levels of law enforcement. At 
the federal level, a May 2013 report highlighted established UAS program offices within 
several federal law enforcement agencies; the FBI, ATF, and DHS Customs and Border 
Protection.36 The same report that documented these programs, found that the FBI and 
ATF deploy UAS for specific operational needs such as a hostage crisis and only under 
very limited circumstances after receiving required approvals including an FAA 
                                                 
33 David Wright, “Should Privacy Impact Assessments Be Mandatory?,” Communications of the ACM 
54 (2011): 121–131; Ira Lamcja, “Canada’s Police Forces Take to the Sky With Drones,” Toronto Metro 
March 18, 2015,  http://www.metronews.ca/news/canada/2015/03/19/canadas-police-forces-taking-to-the-
sky-with-drones.html; Ciara Bracken-Roche et al., Surveillance Drones: Privacy Implications of the Spread 
of UAVs in Canada (Kingston, ON, Canada: Surveillance Studies Centre, April 30, 2014), 
http://www.sscqueens.org/sites/default/files/Surveillance_Drones_Report.pdf. 
34 Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada (OPC), Drones in Canada: Will the Proliferation of 
Domestic Drone Use in Canada Raise New Concerns for Privacy? Quebec, Canada: OPC. 
35 Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada (OPC), Drones in Canada: Will the Proliferation of 
Domestic Drone Use in Canada Raise New Concerns for Privacy? Quebec, Canada: OPC. 
36 Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Audit Division, Interim Report on the 
Department of Justice’s Use and Support of Unmanned Aircraft System. (Washington, DC:  Department of 
Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Audit Division, September 2013), 
http://www.justice.gov/oig/reports/2013/a1337.pdf. 
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certificate of airworthiness (COA). In May 2015, a Department of Justice working group 
released a white paper after studying DOJ use of UAS over several years and considered 
how the technology is likely to evolve in the future.37 The paper focused on three core 
areas: respect for civil rights and liberties, protection of privacy, and accountability. DOJ 
policy guidance requires federal agencies to report UAS use describing the types and 
categories of missions flown to the Deputy Attorney General on an annual basis. The 
DOJ policy guidance referenced above linked nicely to the “Presidential Memorandum: 
Promoting Economic Competitiveness While Safeguarding Privacy, Civil Rights and 
Civil Liberties in Domestic Use of UAS.”38 The DHS program focuses on the use of 
UAS for the nation’s border security, is operational on a daily basis, and was established 
in 2003.39 Deployed by agents from Customs and Border Protection (CBP), unarmed 
Predator drones operated by CBP have become an important countermeasure for border 
security through their ability to provide high-tech intelligence, surveillance and 
reconnaissance.40 A watchdog group and some lawmakers were critical of the number of 
times that CBP allowed other departments such as the Coast Guard and Drug 
Enforcement Administration (DEA) to borrow their UAS for unspecified missions 
deemed classified and that the practice was unmonitored.41 Civil libertarians remain 
concerned that the camera technology on board a CBP drone could be used for persistent 
surveillance of Americans.   
                                                 
37 Department of Justice, “Domestic Use of Unmanned Aircraft Systems,” accessed September 10, 
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It is difficult to determine the number of police departments that are operating 
UAS at this time. Early and careful data collection on law enforcement use of UAS is 
nearly absent in the literature, reflecting the fact of their early and limited use. This 
researcher has used two methods to determine their use by state and local law 
enforcement. First, the FAA has released a list of public agencies for which they have 
issued a Certificate of Authorization (COA) to operate a UAS in response to a lawsuit 
filed by the Electronic Frontier Foundation.42 There are 19 police departments on the list. 
The second method that this researcher used to determine the number of police 
departments that may be operating a UAS was drawn from a DOJ grant receipt list 
published in 2013. The literature suggests that UAS are not widely used domestically for 
homeland security support despite their many benefits due to sluggish integration and 
technology that has not matured to allow safe routine operations.43  
The first known deployment of a UAS by a local and state police department 
occurred in 2009 outside Austin, Texas.44 As dawn broke, SWAT commanders from the 
Texas Department of Public Safety used the UAS to surveil for unforeseen dangers 
before executing a high-risk search warrant. The decision mitigated risk because it 
avoided placing a police helicopter crew in a situation where it could have been shot 
down, one of the central themes that advocates for UAS use on certain missions in lieu of 
placing a manned aircraft in harm’s way. The tactical decision set in motion much public 
debate about the use of UAS for surveillance by domestic law enforcement. Two years 
later, the first arrest and conviction aided by a UAS of a North Dakota cattle rancher took 
place. This situation involved a 16-hour standoff with police that ended when the local 
police department borrowed a Predator drone operated by the CBP along the U.S. 
                                                 
42 Electronic Frontier Foundation, “Proponent COA,” accessed September 10, 2015. 
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northern border to locate the subject on his ranch, making it safe for a SWAT team to 
take the heavily armed man into custody.45 
Local and state law enforcement agencies currently operating a UAS are required 
by the FAA to have a COA.46 A COA is issued by the FAA for a specific UAS activity. 
The FAA conducts a comprehensive operational and technical review before issuing an 
UAS COA. Provisions and limitations may be imposed as part of the approval to ensure 
the UAS can operate safety in the NAS. A Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) 
between the FAA UAS Integration Office and the DOJ Office of Justice Programs has 
established an accelerated approval path for law enforcement while the FAA determines 
the best method of integration.47 
F. FUTURE USE OF UAS BY U.S. LAW ENFORCEMENT 
At present, local and state law enforcement officials have exercised caution in 
authorizing UAS operations in a cloudy policy and regulatory environment while UAS 
technologists have focused on expanding their capabilities to capitalize on the anticipated 
explosion of the commercial UAS industry by developing more diverse functions.48 UAS 
come in all shapes and sizes, from extremely small versions that fit in a backpack to 
considerable large aircraft-sized drones.49 Hundreds of UAS exist on the market. When 
selecting a UAS for public safety missions, an agency should allow the mission to drive 
the purchase of the technology.  
Technological innovation within the UAS industry has created a multitude of 
capabilities of interest to domestic law enforcement agencies to include remote sensing of 
homeland threats such as biological, chemical, and physical environmental factors, and 
                                                 
45 Jason Koebler, “North Dakota Man Sentenced to Jail in Controversial Drone Arrest Case,” U.S. 
News Digital Weekly, January 15, 2014. 
46 Federal Aviation Administration, “Fact Sheet – Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS),” January 6, 
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47 Airborne Law Enforcement Association, “Memorandum of Understanding,” accessed September 
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48 Department of Defense (DOD), Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap FY2011–2036, (n.p.: 
Progressive Management, 2012). 
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aerial surveillance with automated object detection useful for suspect identification and 
tracking.50 A UAS equipped with an advanced optical camera has the potential to assist 
law enforcement with crowd control/demonstrations, tactical operations, criminal 
apprehension, and counter narcotics operations. Unfortunately, there is little empirical 
data that assists in defining an appropriate mission profile for law enforcement against 
the backdrop of the public appetite for acceptance. Progressive UAS technology has also 
led to the development of UAS focused on challenging search and rescue (SAR) missions 
too dangerous for a piloted aircraft or individuals on foot.51  
There is the potential for UAS to play a significant role in emergency 
management, a humanitarian role often coordinated by law enforcement agencies. The 
use of a UAS high-tech camera and infrared systems has been found to be extremely 
valuable in assessing disaster stricken areas following natural disasters such as 
earthquakes, floods, tornados, hurricanes, wild fires, and the like. Because there is inherit 
risk to flying UAS in close proximity to humans in inhabited areas, risk mitigation 
strategies should be implemented.52 
G. PRIVACY CONCERNS OF UAS OPERATIONS  
The privacy issues that surround the domestic use of UAS form a significant, 
deep-rooted for public support of UAS in public safety.53 The potential deployment of 
UAS by law enforcement agencies has prompted concerns that their use could result in 
violations of privacy and civil liberties if mass surveillance were allowed. It is important 
for an agency to be transparent with the mission profile and develop policies to help 
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safeguard the privacy of the public they serve. The concerns for violations of individual 
privacy develop from the ability of UAS to fly high, undetected by the naked eye and in 
almost total silence.54 Criminal justice professionals, operating within the parameters of 
the Fourth Amendment, obtain warrants through the normal judicial process when the use 
of technology is needed to investigate criminal activity. The privacy issues are the most 
difficult to navigate because they elicit human emotions, attitudes, and interpretations. 
The literature indicates that the debate has been particularly volatile during the 20th and 
21st centuries—when the court’s view of a constitutional right (or at least “value”) and 
the public’s expectation of the sphere activity free from government observation 
changed.55  
The problem begins with the fact that the word “privacy” does not appear in the 
U.S. Constitution; rather the right, whatever its extent, has been read into various 
provisions, most notably the Fourth Amendment, which protects “[t]he right of the people 
to be secure persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches  and 
seizures”56 by the government, most urgently by law enforcement. The wording has been 
held to apply to all kinds of law enforcement searches and seizures. As such, the 
following Supreme Court decisions bind law enforcement aviation, whether manned or 
unmanned as a function of surveillance and search: 
1. Katz v. United States—1967 
The Court in Katz v. United States57 expanded the parameters considerably, 
holding that warrantless wiretapping is, by definition, an unreasonable search.58 The 
novelty of this case came in the switch to applying the Fourth Amendment expectation of 
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privacy to persons, rather than just places.59 In other words, officials needed a warrant to 
tap a telephone booth where Katz was illegally wagering on college basketball games,60 
because a search occurs whenever a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy: 
“Wherever a man may be, he is entitled he to know that he will remain free from 
unreasonable searches and seizures.”61  
This case also signaled the extent to which the telephone had become central to 
the daily life of Americans.62 The widespread acceptance of an expanded warrant regime 
also appeared in the Omnibus Crime/Safe Street Act,63 which was signed into law by 
President Lyndon B. Johnson in 1968. Title III of the statue expressively added law 
enforcement use of electronic surveillance to the kinds of searches and seizures that 
require warrants or the equivalent order.64   
2. California v. Ciarolo—1986 
Technology continued to advance and, eventually, so did the controlling 
jurisprudence. In California v. Ciarolo,65 the Supreme Court held that a flyover 
observation from 1000 feet of a back yard—even though the yard was double fenced to 
obscure view from the street was a reasonable search within the Fourth Amendment: 
“The Fourth Amendment simply does not require the police traveling in the public 
airways … to obtain a warrant in order to observe what is visible to the naked eye.”66 In 
this case, what was visible was a stand of 73 marijuana plants.67 Writing for the majority, 
Chief Justice Warren Burger noted: 
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That the observation from aircraft was directed at identifying the plants and the 
officers were trained to recognize marijuana is irrelevant. Such observation is 
precisely what a judicial officer needs to provide a basis for a warrant. Any 
member of the public flying in this airspace who glanced down could have seen 
everything that these officers observed. On this record, we readily conclude that 
respondent’s expectation that his garden was protected from such observation is 
unreasonable, and is not an expectation that society is prepared to honor.68 
The lower courts had made much of Ciarolo’s back yard forming part of the 
“curtilage” of the house—which Chief Justice Burger defined as the common-law view 
of “the area to which extends the intimate activity associated with the ‘sanctity of a man’s 
home and the privacies of life.’”69  Even so, the Court wrote: “That the area is within the 
curtilage does not itself bar all police observation,”70 including observation from the 
public airways. After all, an earlier Court as long ago as 1946 had already determined 
that the “ancient doctrine that at common law ownership of the land extended to the 
periphery of the universe—cujus est solum ejus est usque and coelom[—] … has no place 
in the modern world.”71 
3. Dow Chemical v. United States—1986 
In the same term as the Ciarolo decision, the Supreme Court extended authority to 
government inspectors flying over commercial property in Dow Chemical v. United 
States.72 The Court held the EPA had statutory authority to use aerial photography to 
perform the inspections under the Clean Air Act: “EPA, as a regulatory and enforcement 
agency, needs no explicit statutory provision to employ methods of observation 
commonly available to the public at large: we hold that the use of aerial observation and 
photography is within EPA’s statutory authority.”73 Whatever protections trade secrecy 
laws at the state level might afford Dow Chemical, they are irrelevant to the 
constitutional question; unless the government wanted to use the information from the 
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photographs to compete with Dow, the company has no legal grounds to prohibit the 
taking or use of the photos.74  Indeed, as Chief Justice Burger’s opinion noted, aerial 
photography had become a fact of daily experience: 
The photographs at issue in this case are essentially like those commonly 
used in mapmaking. Any person with an airplane and an aerial camera 
could readily duplicate them. In common with much else, the technology 
of photography has changed in this century. These developments have 
enhanced industrial processes, and indeed all areas of life; they have also 
enhanced law enforcement techniques.75 
Finally, Dow attempted to argue that its sprawling industrial campus, which 
encompassed some 2000 acres, constituted its “curtilage,” in which space it had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy. The Court disagreed, concluding instead that “such an 
industrial complex is more comparable to an open field, and, as such, it is open to the 
view and observation of persons in aircraft lawfully in the public airspace immediately 
above or sufficiently near the area for the reach of cameras.”76 Thus, ultimately, the 
Court found that “the taking of aerial photographs of an industrial plant complex from 
navigable airspace is not a search prohibited by the Fourth Amendment.”77  
4. Florida v. Riley—1989 
How close can authorities get to the curtilage?  In Florida v. Riley,78 respondent 
Michael A. Riley argued that police officers in a helicopter 400 feet above his property—
and below the FAA’s 500-foot minimum for navigable airspace—had crossed that line. 
In a plurality opinion—a somewhat surprising show of disunity granted the clear 
precedent set by Ciarolo—the Court at least agreed that the helicopter observation 
constituted no search in the Fourth Amendment sense and, thus, required no warrant.79 
The Court’s conclusion was cautionary, however: 
                                                 
74 Dow Chemical, 476 U.S. at 232. 
75 Dow Chemical, 476 U.S. at 231. 
76 Dow Chemical, 476 U.S. at 239. 
77 Dow Chemical, 476 U.S. at 239. 
78 Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989). 
79 Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. at 445. 
 23
This is not to say that an inspection of the curtilage of a house from an 
aircraft will always pass muster under the Fourth Amendment simply 
because the plane is within the navigable airspace specified by law. But it 
is of obvious importance that the helicopter in this case was not violating 
the law, and there is nothing in the record or before us to suggest that 
helicopters flying at 400 feet are sufficiently rare in this country to lend 
substance to respondent’s claim that he reasonably anticipated that his 
greenhouse would not be subject to observation from that altitude. Neither 
is there any intimation here that the helicopter interfered with respondent’s 
normal use of the greenhouse or of other parts of the curtilage. As far as 
this record reveals, no intimate details connected with the use of the home 
or curtilage were observed, and there was no undue noise, and no wind, 
dust, or threat of injury. In these circumstances, there was no violation of 
the Fourth Amendment.80 
5. Kyllo v. United States—2001 
The Court’s penchant for identifying disqualifying characteristics of a given 
search—as a means of reining in the seemingly limitless realm in which a person has a 
reasonable expectation of privacy from government surveillance—gained real traction in 
Kyllo v. United States.81 In this case, the Court held that the use of thermal imaging to 
detect heat emanating from the petitioners triplex home was a search. Of particular 
concern was the thermal imaging equipment that the police used in their search for 
characteristic heat exhaust from high-powered lights used to grow marijuana indoors. 
Although the police investigators were on the public street at the time they pointed their 
sensors at Kyllo’s house, the technology allowed them “to explore details of the home 
that would previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion.”82  As Justice 
Antonin Scalia wrote for the majority: 
It would be foolish to contend that the degree of privacy secured to 
citizens by the Fourth Amendment has been entirely unaffected by the 
advance of technology. For example, … the technology enabling human 
flight has exposed to public view (and hence, we have said, to official 
observation) uncovered portions of the house and its curtilage that once 
were private. … The question we confront today is what limits there are 
upon this power of technology to shrink the realm of guaranteed privacy.83 
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82 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40. 
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Scalia found some limits in the thermal imagery equipment, for two reasons: “We 
think that obtaining by sense-enhancing technology any information regarding the 
interior of the home that could not otherwise have been obtained without physical 
‘intrusion into a constitutionally protected area,’ Silverman, 365 U. S., at 512, constitutes 
a search at least where (as here) the technology in question is not in general public use.”84 
6. United States v. Jones—2012 
Finally, in United States v. Jones,85 the Supreme Court took a significant step 
back from the Katz standard of attaching Fourth Amendment privacy rights to people 
rather than places. In this case, the FBI and police authorities in Maryland and the 
District of Columbia affixed a GPS tracking device to a Jeep Grand Cherokee registered 
to the wife of Antoine Jones, a nightclub owner suspected of narcotics trafficking. The 
authorities actually had applied for and received a warrant for this measure, “authorizing 
installation of the device in the District of Columbia and within 10 days.”86   The tracker 
was not installed until the eleventh day, however, and it happened in Maryland. The 
tracker remained in place for 28 days.87 
The Court’s frustration with authorities for their careless treatment of the warrant 
conditions is evident in the majority opinion, but the crux of the decision is the trespass 
committed when law enforcement officials placed the GPS device in the vehicle, Jones’s 
personal property.88  Justice Scalia wrote:  
It is important to be clear about what occurred in this case: The 
Government physically occupied private property for the purpose of 
obtaining information. We have no doubt that such a physical intrusion 
would have been considered a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment when it was adopted.89   
  
                                                 
84 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 33. 
85 United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. (2012).  
86 Jones, 565 U.S. at 2. 
87 Jones, 565 U.S. at 2. 
88 Jones, 565 U.S. at 3. 
89 Jones, 565 U.S. at 5. 
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The trespass made the search unreasonable and, thus, illegal, according to the 
Jones opinion. The question of whether the widespread availability and civilian use of 
GPS did not enter into the majority decision—and thus leaves open one of the major 
threshold issues for UAS use in police surveillance. 
Legal issues that arise as technologies emerge remain unsolved and will be at the 
center of future debate and UAS legislation. Scholars have recommended voluntary 
measures that law enforcement can take until additional case law is established.90 These 
recommendations include adopting IACP policy and the code of conduct from AUVSI.  
H. LEGISLATION 
The general mistrust of the federal government by the American people has 
legislative bodies debating and attempting passage of regulations limiting UAS use. 
There are long periods of great overlap of the related privacy issues that concern the 
citizenry. It comes as no surprise that when Congress blesses an idea as law, then it is 
presumably the will of the people. Many states have taken steps in response to advocacy 
groups such as the ACLU to propose state-specific legislation about UAS use within state 
borders.91 Though the focus and goals of proposed legislation vary from state to state, an 
impressive amount of legislation was enacted or proposed in 2013 and 2014.92 Among 
the state legislation being considered are proposals that would ban an operator’s ability to 
arm a UAS with lethal or less-than-lethal weaponry (a position adopted by the IACP).93 
Other states have focused their legislation on prohibiting mass surveillance or limiting 
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surveillance to groups such as farmers and ranchers.94 Advocates for privacy believe that 
most state legislation has fallen short on addressing privacy issues fully.95 Independent 
public policy organizations have attempted to educate legislators to avoid passing 
legislation that too narrowly restricts or eliminates UAS use.96 There is evidence that 
supports a position that broadly worded requirements for police to obtain warrants do not 
protect privacy and safety but instead, can allow for criminal behavior to flourish.97 
Legislation should be enacted that strikes the proper balance between individual property 
rights and the use of technology for surveillance when needed for a legitimate purpose. 
As Gregory McNeal describes in Drones and Aerial Surveillance, “the best way to 
achieve that goal is to follow a property-centric approach, coupled with limits on 
pervasive surveillance, enhanced transparency measures, and data protection 
procedures”98 When confronted with related policy decisions, an elected body must 
debate the use of information collected incidental to a lawful arrest and determine the 
storage criteria for related data. Additionally, concerns surround how to handle 
government access to data collected by a UAS with a commercial purpose. There remains 
an argument that UAS are no more of an invasion of privacy than police helicopter 
surveillance. Many of the proposed state bills allow law enforcement to obtain 
information from “plain view” or open space without a warrant.  
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Figure 1.  Restrictive UAS Legislation 
 
From AUVSI, “Maryland Passes Pro-UAS Legislation; AUVSI Defeats 12th Anti-UAS 
Bill in 2015,” June 9, 2015 http://www.auvsi.org/hamptonroads/blogs/auvsi-advocacy 
/2015/06/09/stateleg6915 
The most current piece of proposed federal legislation affecting UAS policy was 
released in the Federal Register on February 23, 2015, as a notice to proposed rule-
making.99 The proposed federal legislation outlines rules on operational limitations, 
operator certification and responsibilities, and aircraft requirements. The key policy 
changes from previous guidance require a UAS to weigh less than 55 lbs. and operate 
within line of sight at 500 ft. AGL or below.100 The proposed regulations eliminate the 
                                                 
99 Federal Aviation Administration, “Overview of Small UAS Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,” 
accessed September, 10, 2015, 
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previous requirement of having a visual observer, but require the “pilot operator” to pass 
an aeronautical knowledge test and then obtain an unmanned aircraft operators 
certification described similar to an airman’s certificate. The proposed regulations do not 
require that a UAS have an airworthiness certificate and does not delineate UAS 
maintenance requirements: a subject advocated by air safety professionals. 
Table 1.   Current versus Proposed UAS Regulations 
FAA UAS Regulations 
March 29, 2012 
FAA Regulations (Proposed) 
February 23, 2015 
 
● Must weigh 4.4 lbs. or less, weight expansion 
allowable up to 25 lbs. under certain conditions 
● Visual Line of Sight (VLOS)required 
● Daylight Operations only 
● Restricted to Class G Airspace Only 
● Maximum altitude 400 AGL 
● Restricted from flying within 5 miles from any airport 
or other location with aviation activities 
● COA initially issued for training and performance 
evaluation only 
● Final COA approved for “defined perimeter” incidents 
only 






● Must weigh less than 55 lbs. 
● Visual Line of Sight (VLOS required 
● Restricted from operating over persons not involved 
with incident 
● Daylight operations only 
● Maximum airspeed 100 mph 
● Maximum altitude 500 AGL 
● Weather minimums - 3 miles visibility 
● Airspace Restrictions: 
 Class A non-authorized 
   Class B, C, D, E, F – ATC    
   Class G -authorized 
● Preflight inspection requirement 
● Operators must pass knowledge test 
● Operators must be vetted by TSA 
● Visual observer may be used, but not required 
● Aircraft markings required  
(same rule as manned aircraft) 
After Federal Aviation Administration, “Small UAS Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 
(NPRM),” last modified June 1, 2015, https://www.faa.gov/uas/nprm/.  
Some federal legislation is present that applies to specific UAS use such as the 
National Security and Federal Lands Protection Act. This legislation allows the National 
Park Service to prohibit or restrict the use of UAS at National Parks.101 The agricultural 
industry is also affected by specific federal legislation that restricts the ability for federal 
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authorities to conduct agricultural monitoring surveillance by UAS as outlined in the 
Farmers Privacy Act of 2012.102  
The ACLU is actively involved in the privacy debate surrounding UAS and has 
provided recommendations to states to enact legislation.103 It recommends several core 
measures so that the privacy of Americans can be protected. It believes regulations 
should restrict usage to emergent situations and warrants must be obtained when use of a 
UAS could collect evidence of a crime.104 The group also advocates restrictions on image 
retention and a requirement that police departments make public notice of their use. An 
effective auditing and tracking mechanism is also part of their core measures for 
implementation.  
I. SAFE OPERATION OF UAS 
The safe operation of UAS appears focused on the implementation of “sense & 
avoid” technology.105 The potential for innovation in UAS is being driven by 
commercialization at both the national and international level in pursuit of regulatory and 
manufacturing standards. Additional analysis through simulation is necessary to further 
develop this technology. 
The research suggests that new methods of ensuring collision avoidance as a way 
of improving integration efforts must continue to be studied.106  
Concerns over command and control latency, vehicle performance, 
reliability of autonomous functions, and interoperability of sense-and-
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avoid systems with the Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System 
(TCAS) and Air Traffic Control must be resolved. [There is a] safety 
evaluation process that the international community has deemed necessary 
to certify such systems. The process focuses on statistically valid 
[estimates] of collision avoidance performance developed through a 
combination of airspace encounter modeling, simulation of the collision 
avoidance system scenarios, and system failure and event sensitivity 
analysis.107 
Numerous military UAS accidents have been attributed to communications 
structures that can easily be interrupted by EMI.108 The disruption of a simple range 
omni-directional signal by a jammer is a concern of safe operation and their ease of use if 
sufficient power is available is equally as troubling. Cyber attacks to UAS need further 
exploration and are not the focus of this research.   
J. LIABILITY OF UNMANNED SYSTEMS 
Autonomous technology, such as UAS, has generated interesting debates in the 
insurance industry. It is possible that the autonomous features will lower collision rates 
and radically change the insurance industry landscape. It is possible that more of the 
burden of liability will be shifted to the UAS manufacturer than the owner and/or 
operator. Diverse academic research on the key policy issues related to UAS integration 
and UAS use by law enforcement enhances the ability of police executives to have 
available a growing body of knowledge necessary to develop UAS policy. The research 
conducted for this thesis is the most current literature, scoped to the issues of UAS 
privacy, safety and liability. The literature review provided the basis for the identification 
of knowledge gaps. Additional research on those knowledge gaps became the framework 
for the IRB-approved Delphi surveys distributed to subject matter experts.  
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III. RESEARCH METHOD—THE DELPHI METHOD 
A. WHAT IS THE DELPHI METHOD? 
The goal of conducting research using the Delphi method was to fill the 
knowledge gaps on UAS law enforcement policy with the most current analysis of the 
key policy issues. By surveying subject matter experts involved with UAS integration, a 
more comprehensive reference for police executives is created. This chapter provides an 
overview of the Delphi method, its historical context of application during war, and its 
application in this thesis. The collection of data from the Delphi panel established the 
framework for predictions and recommendations that are outlined in the concluding 
chapter of this thesis. 
The Delphi Method is a social science research technique that was first developed 
to make an academic prediction on the impact technology would have during an in-
theater conflict.109 Its predictive features are closely linked to game theory. Frustrated by 
the shortcomings of traditional forecasting methods as he and several colleagues were 
attempting to decide the likely effects of a bombing strategy, Olaf Helmer argued that 
decisions in social science policy could be made with accuracy on the exercise of expert 
judgment and intuition.110 The Delphi Method uses a series of questionnaires to collect 
opinions from a panel of subject matter experts. It is well suited as a means and method 
to gain the most reliable consensus of a group.111 Contrary to other data analysis 
techniques, The Delphi Method uses multiple iterations. During the iteration phase, 
questionnaires are returned to the researcher, who “codes” responses. Based on the 
analysis of responses, subsequent rounds of questions are developed with a statement of 
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the position of the whole group.112 A primary advantage of the Delphi Method is the 
mutual anonymity of the respondents, which can reduce the influence of manipulation 
and coercion from dominant individuals that is often a problem with group-based 
processes. It also tends to encourage and increase candor in responses. Through secure 
online surveys to solicit and exchange information, confidentiality is facilitated by 
geographic dispersion of the respondents.  
The Delphi Method has the potential of develop solutions for planning, policy and 
resource utilization. Historically, these are all areas in which effective application has 
been demonstrated in the academic setting. There are also several limitations to the 
Delphi Method that must be considered by a researcher that have the potential to affect 
survey candidate selection. A researcher must allow enough time to conduct and 
complete the research while facing the possibility of low response rates. In addition, a 
researcher must be aware of unintentional guidance to a respondent group that could steer 
a dialogue in a particular direction and call into question the integrity of the data. 
B. THE EMPLOYMENT OF THE DELPHI METHOD IN THIS THESIS 
The Delphi Method was employed to aggregate and code the knowledge and 
judgment of subject matter experts involved with UAS integration and law enforcement 
UAS policy development. The subject matter experts recruited as the Delphi respondents 
were identified by senior personnel at the Unmanned Aircraft Systems Integration Office, 
Federal Aviation Administration, and Department of Transportation. The literature 
review confirmed that these individuals were centrally involved in the development of 
UAS regulations and possessed experience with law enforcement UAS policy. Nine 
respondents were recruited for participation, and all nine participated in all three rounds 
of data collection. They were recruited from the following organizations: 
 Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice 
 Airborne Law Enforcement Association 
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 International Association of Chiefs of Police 
 University of North Dakota, John D. Odegard School of Aerospace 
Sciences, Center for Unmanned Aircraft Systems 
 Michigan State Police 
 Mesa County, Colorado Sheriff’s Office 
 Brookings Institute 
 LeClairRyan 
 TrueNorth Consulting LLC 
To combine independent analysis with maximum feedback for building consensus 
and recognizing dissent among UAS integration experts, an IRB-approved sequence was 
established for Delphi panel participants. 
1. Survey participants received an introductory phone call from the student 
researcher, explaining the research project and requesting consent to 
participate. 
2. The student researcher forwarded a link to LimeSurvey Tool to each 
participate. LimeSurvey tool is a program approved by NPS for use in 
Human Subjects Research. The link directed each participant to a consent 
form. Once consent was received by the researcher, the first round of 
questions became available to the participant (Appendix A). 
3. Following an analysis by the student researcher of the first round survey 
responses, a second round of survey questions was developed and 
forwarded to each participate (Appendix B). 
4. Following an analysis by the student researcher of the second round 
survey responses, a third and final round of survey questions was 
developed and forwarded to each participate (Appendix C). 
The risk of a breach of confidentiality was mitigated by keeping the personally 
identifiable information (PII) separate from the survey data being collected. It was 
necessary to collect PII on each participant as part of the identification and recruitment 
process. The survey responses have been de-identified and are not linked here to 
individual participants.  
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C. SURVEY GOALS AND A PRIOR ASSUMPTIONS 
The overarching goal of applying the Delphi Method in this research project was 
to provide further investigation of the key issues prevalent in the literature related to 
public safety UAS implementation in a regulatory environment. The Delphi method 
exposes and explores areas of dissent, confusion, contradiction, ignorance and 
consensus.113 Academic research that aggregates, analyzes, and draws conclusions from 
the opinions of subject matter experts on key policy issues is a valuable resource for 
police executives or elected officials challenged by complex public policy decisions. 
When policy makers are able to review all sides of a debate, they have the best 
opportunity to avoid wasteful spending, mitigate risk and liability, and prevent public 
backlash. This transparency of the complex array of issues provides the most sustainable 
platform for a UAS to become a useful tool in public safety operations and crime-fighting 
strategies, and possibly become a model algorithm for how innovations in technology can 
transform policing.  
Prior to administering the survey, this researcher predicted that the subject matter 
experts would agree that a law enforcement agency’s successful development and 
execution of a sustainable UAS program would be directly linked to early community 
engagement to include civil liberty advocates, public messaging and transparency. This 
researcher also believed that a law enforcement agency, prior to operating a UAS, should 
establish protocols with well-defined training and operational requirements that 
complement the FAA’s Interim Operational Approval Guidance 08–01.114 
The first round of survey questions was drafted to establish a baseline from which 
to work forward on the key policy issues. First, the respondents were asked to describe 
the primary challenges with integrating UAS into the national airspace, based on the 
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proposed regulations released by Federal Register on February 23, 2015.115 This 
description needed to include how the proposed regulations addressed the principles of 
safe operation, privacy, and liability at the federal level.  
Second, because the literature suggests that technology will weigh heavily on safe 
operating standards in the future, garnering expert opinions of the adaptability of new 
regulations and policies to new technologies is a primary consideration for policy makers. 
As a result, three survey questions were compassed on the intuitive judgement of experts 
with a vision for UAS as a law enforcement technology in the future.  
The third goal was to establish the viewpoints of the subject matter experts on law 
enforcement UAS policy and the related primary challenges of implementation within the 
culture of a police department. This set of questions addressed issues of safe operation, 
privacy, and liability issues specific to law enforcement UAS missions.  
  
                                                 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 37
IV. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS OF DELPHI 
A. UAS INTEGRATION 
Respondents to the Delphi surveys identified a host of challenges with integrating 
UAS into a busy national airspace system. Among the primary challenges are the volume 
of anticipated UAS operators that could quickly overwhelm the air traffic control system 
and the inability for present-day radar infrastructure to track small UAS, creating an 
environment that prevents timely information to be passed to airman. With the entire 
national airspace system based on the see-and-avoid principle, it is challenging to 
introduce UAS that neither a pilot nor a radar operator can view. The primary challenge 
addressed in the proposed regulations is the establishment of strict guidelines on altitude 
and distance separation.  
During round one of the Delphi survey, six out of nine respondents felt that 
requiring day operations within visual line of sight of the operator was the primary means 
by which the regulations attempted to address air safety. Restricting where UAS can fly 
and the requirement to identify a defined perimeter was felt to mitigate, but not eliminate 
the lack of UAS reliability and airworthiness standards. During the second round of 
survey questions, several respondents (5, 6, 9, and 8) further elaborated on sense and 
avoid technology. Five out of nine respondents concluded that until sense-and-avoid 
technology was available in civil aviation infrastructure, strict UAS policy and aggressive 
enforcement would be necessary to prevent mishaps. 
An additional theme of concern voiced by all but one respondent was that the 
FAA did not have enough empirical data to develop the proposed UAS regulations. 
Respondent nine, who identified himself as a panel member on the FAA UAS Advisory 
and Rule Making Committee, whose recommendations formed the foundation for the 
proposed regulations, was in agreement that there was not enough empirical data. 
Respondent four wrote that divergent stakeholder groups with vested influence in 
building, selling and operating UAS played a role in the proposed rule-making. Round 
three, questions two and three explored the political pressure that influenced the speed at 
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which the proposed regulations received attention from the FAA. Five out of nine 
respondents felt the political pressure was significant and influenced the proposed 
regulations before they were well vetted.  
Respondents were asked to provide recommendations on how UAS integration 
could have been proposed differently. Five out of nine respondents indicated that greater 
industry and public safety involvement would have been beneficial. Respondents 1, 3, 
and 5 identified that the advances of UAS technology and the demand for the technology 
did not allow for a well thought out implementation strategy based on the inputs the FAA 
was receiving.  
When the proposed UAS regulations were published in February 2015, advocates 
for safe integration were surprised that mandatory airworthiness standards were not part 
of the guidance. Five out of nine respondents thought voluntary standards would not be 
effective. Respondent 4 stated that reasonable standards supported by rigorous testing and 
linked to funding mechanisms that require airworthiness standards may be an alternate 
method of ensuring agencies are operating reliable and effective UAS that mitigate 
liability. Legitimate manufacturers will emphasize the capabilities and technical 
standards that their devices meet. There was dissent among the respondent group about 
which component of airworthiness is the most important. While some respondents felt 
that software and control system security was the most vulnerable feature requiring 
standards, others felt that airframe, power plant, props and rotors were equally important.  
Despite the disagreement over which component was most vulnerable, the 
respondents agreed that if airworthiness standards were developed in the future, they 
should follow the same general guidelines as manned aircraft and the industry could 
benefit from independent standard development organizations such as IEEE, ASTM and 
UL working in partnership with the FAA. Respondents envision minimum airworthiness 
standards on components, radio frequency, speed, payload, weight as well as mandates 
for maintenance intervals, inspections and lighting/markings.  
Strong advocacy for the implementation of sense-and-avoid technology emerged 
in the responses. Three respondents (3, 5, 7) indicated that while sense-and-avoid 
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technology was several years away from full implementation and is aligned with ADS-B 
implementation. Companies such as Google and Amazon, who have strong profit-driven 
reasons to invest in UAS technology, are likely to boost the research timeline. Three 
respondents (2, 3, 7) indicated that sense-and-avoid technology may be both payload- and 
cost-prohibitive for operators of small UAS. Respondent 2 indicated that full 
implementation of sense-and-avoid technology would have the potential to allow the 
FAA to remove the line of sight restriction and allow safe long distance UAS operations 
expanding the mission profile of an approved law enforcement UAS program. 
B. PRIVACY CONCERNS 
One of the most debated topics within UAS integration surrounds privacy and the 
perception of potential intrusiveness. Six out of nine respondents of the survey group 
described this policy issue as overstated, misrepresented, a distracting force to general 
integration strategy, and a perceptional challenge for law enforcement. The survey group 
was unanimous in its opinion that the issue of privacy was not addressed in the 
integration strategy or the proposed regulations because it is not within the statutory 
authority of the FAA. Commercial UAS operator privacy enforcement has been delegated 
to the Department of Commerce, National Telecommunication and Information 
Administration (NTIA). The Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, under the legal 
framework of the Fourth and First Amendments, will provide oversight of public 
operators. It is interesting to note that the FAA did compel the six FAA-approved UAS 
test sites to develop privacy policies as part of their operating authority. 
There are two conceptual frameworks that emerged from the survey on how to 
manage the privacy issues surrounding a law enforcement UAS program appropriately. 
First, three out of seven respondents advocated for transparency measures, such as an 
independent advisory board and early public messaging, for a department considering 
implementing a UAS program. The second and collateral approach is to ensure 
appropriate digital evidence procedures are in place that adequately address image 
retention and storage. Respondents did not view this approach as new, but rather as 
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consistent with sound public policy formulation. Several respondents referenced IACP 
guidelines as a model template that adequately addresses these issues.  
During the second round survey, respondents were asked whether they believed 
the Fourth Amendment case law that applied to manned aircraft and other technology 
used by the police was adequate and applicable to UAS. There was disagreement among 
the survey group on this topic. Four respondents (1, 3, 7, 9) believed that current case law 
would provide the appropriate legal framework for UAS. Five respondents (2, 4, 5, 6) felt 
that a new legal framework will likely be created as UAS search and seizure cases make 
their way to the Appellate and Supreme Court. It is interesting to note that two 
respondents in the survey group are practicing attorneys representing government clients 
in aviation-related matters including UAS, and they disagree on whether current case law 
is an adequate legal framework. Three respondents (1, 2, 9) felt that external factors 
derived by the modern electronic age, such as the NSA’s controversial surveillance 
programs, Hollywood, and the general public mistrust of the government is likely to 
generate new and applicable case law.  
C. UAS LIABILITY 
UAS has the potential to transform certain characteristics of policing. Once the 
proposed regulations are in place, a liability framework will emerge that will lead to an 
increased need for insurance. Survey respondents agreed unanimously that the proposed 
regulations do not address liability, but the literature suggests that federal regulation may 
even require minimum liability coverage in the future.116 There was also consensus in the 
survey group that the ultimate liability for any government agency that chooses to operate 
a UAS in support of their public safety mission rests with the agency itself. Three 
respondents (5, 8, 9) believed that a portion of UAS liability from a police department 
could attach to a third party if culpable negligence is present through defective 
manufacturing and/or software glitches. Respondents drew a distinction between the 
autonomous car and a UAS. No clear path to taking human interface out of the decision 
                                                 
116 Jonathan S. Ziss, “Drone Regulation Would Create Need for Liability Insurance,” Business 
Insurance, November 23, 2014, 
http://www.businessinsurance.com/article/20141123/ISSUE0401/311239999. 
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loop in civil UAS operations has been established. Respondent 4 equated the 
characteristics of true autonomy with the current debates on autonomous cars. Three 
respondents (4, 3, 7) view the liability framework as part of the evolution of the 
technology, yet reliant still on traditional principles of foreseeability, reasonableness, 
duty of care, assumption of risk, and intent.  
D. SAFE OPERATIONS IN A LAW ENFORCEMENT UAS PROGRAM 
A review of respondent answers to survey questions about maintaining safe 
operations reveals themes similar to those on model safety policies of manned airborne 
law enforcement operations. Implementing and enforcing comprehensive unit policies 
aligned with FAA regulations, adopting a mission profile and outlining a mission 
approval process, developing a minimum initial and recurrent training program, and 
implementing a risk assessment tool and comprehensive safety management system are 
included in respondent recommendations (1, 3, 7, 9).  
There is dissent among the survey group in its assessment of whether the COA 
approval process for law enforcement creates a culture of safe operations. The 
perspective of survey respondents is that a safety culture must emerge from within the 
organization, must be consistent with manned aviation culture, and cannot be correlated 
with the COA (4, 6, 9). An opposing view was expressed by several respondents 
describing the FAA COA process as a comprehensive review that contributes to the 
establishment of safe operations (1, 2, 7, 9). Two respondents (3, 5) stated that it is 
difficult to assess the true impact on the COA on public safety UAS operations as the 
process is still in its infancy and no empirical data has been collected.  
E. LAW ENFORCEMENT MISSION PROFILE 
The survey group was unanimous that a law enforcement agency can operate a 
UAS and that both the number of agencies operating a UAS in support of their 
Department’s mission and the mission profile of a law enforcement UAS program will 
expand under the proposed regulatory environment. The consensus of the respondents is 
that UAS could support about a third of the missions flown by manned police aircraft at a 
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significant cost savings and serve many roles that are not filled by more expensive assets 
or other tactics.  
Respondents outlined three basic challenges to agencies implementing a UAS 
program. The primary challenge was education, assuring the public that the UAS will not 
be used to invade their privacy or to collect and store data that has no specific purpose 
other than broad sweeping of the jurisdiction fishing for evidence of criminal behavior. A 
second challenge is convincing the political arm of local government that the expense of 
owning and operating a UAS unit is a worthwhile expenditure of taxpayers’ money, and 
that the technology can serve a useful purpose that cannot be readily achieved by other 
means. A third area of concern is safe operations of the UAS so that they do not interfere 
with manned air traffic or create an undue hazard to people and property on the ground. 
The importance of safety resonated throughout all three iterations, among all 
respondents. The minimum training requirements recommended by the survey group 
went well beyond the requirements established by the proposed regulations: 
 Review of applicable FAA regulations and guidance 
 Current UAS Systems overview 
 Pre-flight inspection requirements 
 Instruction on airspace classification 
 Instruction on aeronautical chart interpretation 
 Comprehensive overview of aviation weather 
 Interpreting notices to airmen (NOTAMS) 
 Basic aviation radio communication terminology 
 Practical exercises on visual scanning 
 Instruction and practical training application of emergency procedures 
including loss of GPS; operation of sensor systems; incident and accident 
criteria and reporting. 
 Review of flight documentation requirements (operator and aircraft 
logbooks) 
 Instruction on Fourth Amendment case law 
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Because of the nature and number of these recommended minimum training 
requirements, there was consensus in the survey group that an agency with an existing 
aviation program would have a considerable advantage starting a UAS unit-based on its 
aviation knowledge and experience over agencies without one. Respondents supported a 
concept modeled on a professional flight department, scaled down to reflect the 
differences in size and complexities of the systems used. Respondents conceded that the 
knowledge gaps for a department with no aviation experience were not insurmountable.  
Survey respondents were asked to identify the primary mission profile of a law 
enforcement UAS program (Appendix D). Respondents (4 and 6; or “7 respondents”) 
indicated that defining the mission profile and communicating that profile to the 








This thesis examined the impact of a new regulatory environment on law 
enforcement use of UAS in support of their mission to investigate crime and protect its 
citizens. The FAA and DOJ have had temporary procedures in place since March 2012 
that issue limited operational guidelines to law enforcement to receive approval for UAS 
flight, but police executives and elected officials have been slow to adopt this technology 
because of concerns over safe operation, intrusiveness and liability.117 In February 2015, 
the FAA released new regulations for public comment after recommendations were 
provided by the UAS ARC. By performing a thorough literature review of the related 
policy issues and querying subject matter experts responsible for creating the architecture 
for the proposed regulations, this researcher was able to conduct an analysis of whether 
the issues of safety, privacy and liability are adequately addressed in the regulations. The 
author also identified their impact on a law enforcement UAS for policy makers to 
consider. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS  
The FAA has proposed a new regulatory environment for both public and 
commercial UAS operations. After careful consideration of the policy issues and 
recommendations identified in this thesis, law enforcement executives and elected 
officials should be able to make informed decisions on UAS use in their community. This 
author supports UAS by a police department and other public safety agencies providing 
the following recommendations are implemented: 
1. A police department should plan for early community engagement, prior 
to UAS program implementation. Early engagement and transparency on 
intended use will assist in building public trust. Educate the public on the 
dramatic differences between a large military predator drone reserved for 
combat operations and the small quad copters under evaluation as a tool 
for law enforcement similar to an RC flyer. Build a UAS mission profile 
                                                 
117  Federal Aviation Administration, “FAA Makes Progress with UAS Integration,” accessed 
September 10, 2015, https://www.faa.gov/news/updates/?newsId=68004. 
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based on input from your community that allows the mission to drive the 
use of the technology and does not encroach on the fringe or outside the 
boundaries of public acceptance. Select an advisory board that will 
develop your concept of operations.  
2. Mandate that operators follow established FAA regulations and receive 
approval through the COA process. Police executives and elected officials 
must know that the COA process does not equate to safe operations, and is 
only the minimal requirement threshold to operate a UAS in the NAS. 
Implementation of safety management system similar to those in manned 
aviation is recommended. 
3. An agency must adopt a comprehensive policy framework that addresses 
safe operations and privacy—including data retention and storage—and 
that protects personally identifiable information and identifies a specific 
mission profile. IACP—Guidelines for the Use of Unmanned Aircraft is a 
model policy that can be used as a template for such policy development. 
4. The lack of regulatory airworthiness standards remains a barrier to safe 
operations. Police departments should therefore model practices from 
manned aviation and develop standards for UAS procurement, 
maintenance and inspection intervals. Opening dialogue with approved 
UAS test sites may be helpful to policy development in this area.  
5. The combined action of regulatory agencies, UAS industry professionals, 
academics, public safety professional and private sector interests is 
required to fully develop, implement and mandate sense-and-avoid 
technology to increase safe operations.  
6. Police personnel who are assigned UAS must complete an agency-
approved training program to ensure proper use and operations. The 
framework for a training program should be based on the following core 
competencies: 
 Applicable FAA regulations and guidance 
 UAS Systems overview 
 Pre-flight inspection 
 Airspace classification 
 Aeronautical chart interpretation 
 Aviation weather 
 Interpreting notices to airmen (NOTAMS) 
 Basic aviation radio communication terminology 
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 Visual scanning 
 Emergency procedures including loss of GPS; operation of sensor 
systems; incident and accident criteria and reporting. 
 Flight documentation (operator and aircraft logbooks) 
 Fourth Amendment case law 
A robust training program should be required at regular intervals to ensure the 
continued effective use and operation, and the proper calibration and performance, of the 
equipment. Commanding officers with the responsibility of approving UAS missions 
should be trained in local and federal laws related to UAS operations. 
The UAS policy landscape is highly fluid at the time of this research. The scope 
of this thesis focused on whether a law enforcement agency should operate a UAS. Our 
conclusion is that with the acquisition and maintenance of technical, legal, and policy 
expertise, law enforcement agencies can and should take advantage of the cost savings, 
technical capabilities, and mission performance offered by this technology. Lateral issues 
outside the scope of this research are the privacy and security risks of UAS operated by 
private citizens and commercial operators, which themselves will shift the debate, the 
response or engagement of law enforcement, and the policy landscape.  
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APPENDIX A. FIRST ROUND DELPHI SURVEY QUESTIONS 
Project Title: Considerations for Domestic Law Enforcement Implementation of a UAS 
Program in the Proposed FAA Regulatory Environment of Integration into the National Airspace 
System 
1st Round Delphi Survey Questions 
Released April 24, 2015 
 1. What are the primary challenges with UAS integration into the National Airspace 
System? 
 
2. How are the principles of safe operation addressed in the UAS integration plan? 
Section I – UAS Airspace 
Integration 3. How are the issues surrounding privacy addressed in the UAS integration plans? 
 
4. How are the issues surrounding liability addressed in the UAS integration plans? 
 
5. How do you think proposed or current regulations will adapt to new UAS 
technologies? 
 
6. Do you believe a law enforcement agency should operate a UAS? 
If yes, why? 
If no, why not? 
Section II - Law 
Enforcement UAS Policy 7. If you believe a law enforcement agency should operate a UAS, what are the primary  
Challenges that a department would face with implementation of a UAS program? 
 8. How should a Law Enforcement UAS program address safe operations issues 
 
9. What should Law Enforcement UAS program training include?  
 
10. How should a Law Enforcement UAS program address privacy issues? 
 
11. How should a Law Enforcement UAS program address liability issues? 
 
12. What do you believe will be the primary mission profile for a law enforcement 
UAS program? 
 
13. Do you believe that the new regulations will allow for a more routine use of 
UAS by a police department? 
 
14. What would a law enforcement UAS deployment protocol look like after new 
regulations are implemented? 
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Following a period of collation and analysis of the first round survey data, a 
second round of survey questions was drafted with the goal of giving a closer 
examination to some of the themes identified from the expert responses in the first round. 
Themes identified in the first round survey data included:  
 Cost benefit analysis of the initial and maintenance cost of UAS 
 Empirical data used by the FAA to develop the proposed UAS regulations 
 The use of “sense and avoid” technology  
 Standards for reliability and airworthiness 
 Data management 
 The importance of privacy related issues and public perception 
 The legal communities interpretation of UAS liability 
 Creating a culture of safe UAS operations within a police department 
 Model UAS policy review and development 
 Law Enforcement UAS mission profile 
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APPENDIX B. SECOND ROUND DELPHI SURVEY QUESTIONS 
Project Title: Considerations for Domestic Law Enforcement Implementation of a UAS Program in the 
Proposed FAA Regulatory Environment of Integration into the National Airspace System 
2nd Round Delphi Survey Questions 
Released May 28, 2015 
 
 1. What are the biggest costs associated with implementation and maintenance of a UAS 
program?  
 2. Do those costs—either individually or in the aggregate—outweigh the benefits of the 
program? 
Section I – UAS 
Airspace Integration 3. Do you agree with this assertion that the FAA did not have enough empirical data when proposing new UAS regulations? If not, please make the counterargument. 
 4. If so, how specifically should UAS integration have been proposed differently? What 
additional or different considerations or information should they have been based on? 
 5. How far away is sense and avoid technology? 
 6. What are the current obstacles to developing, launching, acquiring or using sense and avoid 
technology? 
 7. Which regulations would need to change once sense and avoid technology is available? 
 8. How will sense and avoid technology effect law enforcement UAS policy? 
 9. How “smart” are the UAS regulations on the point of air safety and how specifically should 
law enforcement policy address it? 
Section II – UAS 
Safety 10. What steps does the UAS industry need to take to improve the reliability of UAS? 
 11. What should airworthiness standards look like for UAS? 
 12. Would establishing standards of data management, perhaps in “blackbox” fashion, for 
examination in the event of a collision be helpful to UAS integration? Please respond to and 
discuss this idea. 
 13. Do you believe that existing privacy/4th Amendment case law as it pertains to manned police 
aircraft is adequate and/or applicable to UAS? Please discuss.  
Section III – UAS 
Privacy 14. What NEW policy, practice or protocol could a law enforcement agency use to allay fears, change perceptions, or address real privacy violations? 
 
 15.UAS operators would assume all liability .Do you agree or disagree with this assessment?  
 16. In what scenarios would liability attach to other parties, e.g., manufacturer, software 
companies, maintenance personnel, third parties, etc. 
 52
Project Title: Considerations for Domestic Law Enforcement Implementation of a UAS Program in the 
Proposed FAA Regulatory Environment of Integration into the National Airspace System 
2nd Round Delphi Survey Questions 
Released May 28, 2015 
 
Section IV – UAS 
Liability 17. To what extent are liability issues in the use of UAS going to resemble existing liability laws and decisions as they pertain to similar technologies or circumstances? What liability issues or 
practices might evolve differently from existing liability laws? 
 18. How will the legal community define negligence in the use of a UAS? 
 19. Companies and insurers involved with driverless cars and the concept of being a “systems 
supervisor” has brought the need for additional legal clarification about liability. How do you 
believe the concept of “system supervisor” changes the liability landscape of UAS?  
 20. Two respondents argued that any police department without a current aviation program 
would lack sufficient expertise in aviation to safety implement a UAS program. Do you agree or 
disagree with this assertion? 
 21. What type and amount of training or certification constitutes minimum required competence 
to implement a UAS program? Please address this at the individual and agency level. 
 22. How might a police department garner public support for its use of a UAS? 
Section V – UAS for 
Law Enforcement 
 
23. Is the current FAA program that allows a police department to operate a UAS after obtaining 
a COA adequate enough to create a culture of safe operation? Please explain your answer. 
 24. Should a police department operating a UAS for a specific incident notify the public of its 
use prior to or during the incident? Please explain your answer 
 25. Should a Temporary Flight Restriction or Notice to Airmen be required during UAS use by 
a police department? Please explain your answer. 
 26. Where does the IACP Unmanned Systems policy need customization or expansion to 
accommodate the specific requirements of UAS technology? 
 27. There was no consensus among respondents on the primary UAS law enforcement missions. 
Which of the missions now flown by manned police aircraft could be executed just as 
effectively by unmanned aircraft? Which would be BETTER executed by a UAS? 
 28. One respondent recommended the use of an external advisory board for LE UAS policies 
and programs. What would be the advantages and disadvantages of an external advisory board? 
 
The second round of survey questions identified several themes from survey 
respondents.  
● UAS effectiveness during mobile incident scenes 
● Political influence of proposed UAS regulations 
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● Privacy influence of proposed UAS regulations 
● Concept and focus of voluntary airworthiness standards 
● Impact of future case law on UAS operations and other technology 
The third and final round of survey questions was drafted with the goal of finalize 
the most appropriate mission profile of a law enforcement UAS program, explore the 
impact of airworthiness standards and further explain the potential impact that UAS will 
have on manned aircraft technology and policy.  
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APPENDIX C. THIRD ROUND DELPHI SURVEY QUESTIONS  
Project Title: Considerations for Domestic Law Enforcement Implementation of a UAS Program in 
the Proposed FAA Regulatory Environment of Integration into the National Airspace System 
3rd Round Delphi Survey Questions 
Released June 21, 2015 
 





1. What changes to UAS would need to take place to make them more effective 
during a mobile situation, such as a search and rescue incident?  
 2. How do you believe politics either positively or negatively influenced the proposed 
regulations? 
Section II – UAS 
Integration 3. Do you believe the FAA was distracted by privacy related concerns when they drafted the new regulations? Please explain your answer. 
 4. What do you believe the impact on the industry will be if the standards are 
voluntary? 
 5. Should airworthiness standards focus mainly on software and control system 
security? What should standards with this focus look like? 
 6. Do you believe that the perception of privacy concerns will drive whether or not a 
police executive will implement a UAS program? If yes, how does a police 
department get beyond the perception? 
 7. Do you believe new case law generated by the use of UAS will be unfavorable to 
both manned and unmanned aircraft in the future? Please explain your answer. 
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APPENDIX D. FUTURE LAW ENFORCEMENT UAS MISSION 
PROFILE 
Law Enforcement UAS Mission Profile 
Delphi Survey Results 
● Crime and traffic scene documentation 
● Searches for victims and suspects within a defined perimeter 
● Roof checks on alarm calls or suspicious circumstances 
● Monitoring large crowds when specific criminal activity and/or riotous behaving is occurring 
● Disaster response and recovery 
●  Radiation, biological and toxic smoke plumes sensing 
● Public safety life preservation mission to include SWAT Operations and active shooter situations 
● Support for fire department operations to assess fire progression and identify hot spots using infrared 
technology 
● Hazardous material incidents 
● Marijuana eradication 
 
 
There was a range of opinion among the group on whether a mobile search and 
rescue situation could be effectively supported by a UAS for reasons described by a 
respondent with significant operational experience. Respondents 1, 5 and 9 felt that a 
UAS operator conducting a search of an area too big could violate the requirement to 
operate the unmanned vehicle within line of sight of the operator; a requirement in the 
COA and proposed regulations. Two respondents (4, 5) focused on the technical 
limitations of a UAS. Both argued that UAS camera systems have a 10-degree field of 
view, while human eyes from a manned aircraft can view 180 degrees. This technical 
limitation makes a manned aircraft a more effective option during mobile search and 
rescue mission not contained within a small defined perimeter.  
The literature suggests that law enforcement policy makers have recognized the 
potential for UAS technology to be leveraged in support of their goals and objectives and 
that guidelines specific to law enforcement are needed on how a police executive would 
implement this technology after considering the police issues. Survey respondents were 
asked to evaluate the IACP – Recommended Guidelines for Use of Unmanned 
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Aircraft.118 It should be noted that survey participants were asked to review the model 
policy published in 2012. Several survey respondents indicated they had knowledge that 
an updated policy was in the process of being drafted by IACP. While the majority of the 
respondents indicated that they did not see significant policy gaps or areas for 
improvement, two respondents indicated that the policy was deficient in addressing issues 
of medical and written examination requirement for UAS operators and operator 
proficiency. One respondent also recommended that flight over a densely populated 
urban area should be specially addressed.  
  
                                                 
118 International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), Recommended Guidelines for the Use of 
Unmanned Aircraft (Alexandria, VA: IACP, August 2012) 
http://www.theiacp.org/portals/0/pdfs/iacp_uaguidelines.pdf. 
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